Summary

This application note describes a simple step-by-step process to generate an encrypted bitstream and encryption key using the Xilinx® Vivado® Design Suite. Steps to program that encryption key and encrypted bitstream into a Xilinx 7 series FPGA using the Vivado Design Suite are included.

Introduction

Xilinx 7 series devices have on-chip Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) decryption logic to provide a high degree of design security. Encrypted 7 series FPGA designs cannot be copied or reverse engineered for use on unintended FPGAs. The 7 series FPGA AES system consists of software-based bitstream encryption and on-chip bitstream decryption with dedicated memory for storing the encryption key. Xilinx Vivado tools are optionally used to generate the encryption key and the encrypted bitstream. A user-generated key from a truly random source is recommended. The 7 series devices store the encryption key internally in either dedicated RAM, backed up by a small externally connected battery (BBRAM), or in the eFUSE. The encryption key can only be programmed onto the device through the JTAG port. The 7 series device performs the reverse operation, decrypting the incoming bitstream during configuration. The 7 series FPGA AES encryption logic uses a 256-bit encryption key. The on-chip AES decryption logic cannot be used for any purpose other than bitstream decryption. AES decryption logic is not available to the user design and cannot be used to decrypt data other than the configuration bitstream.

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Authentication

The 7 series FPGA encryption system uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm. AES is an official standard supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Commerce [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf). The 7 series FPGA AES encryption system uses a 256-bit encryption key (the alternate key lengths of 128 and 192 bits described by NIST are not implemented) to encrypt or decrypt blocks of 128 bits of data at a time. According to the NIST, there are $1.1 \times 10^{77}$ possible key combinations for a 256-bit key. Symmetric encryption algorithms such as AES use the same key for encryption and decryption. The security of the data is therefore dependent on the secrecy of the key.
The AES supported in 7 series FPGAs is identical to that supported in Xilinx Virtex®-6 devices. (The AES support has been validated, see the Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation List at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/aes/aesval.html#2363.) A 256-bit encryption key is loaded into the eFUSE bits or battery-backed RAM by the user. The Xilinx bitstream writer, using AES, encrypts the bitstream. This feature allows you to encrypt your bitstream using 256-bit AES encryption in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. You can supply a 128-bit Initial Vector and 256-bit key, or let the software choose a random key. Allowing the Vivado Design Suite to generate the key is not as secure as generating your own key by means of a truly random process (see XAPP1084 [Ref 1]). Some security features such as the ability for the FPGA logic to clear the AES key from battery-backed RAM require that the part is configured with an encrypted bitstream in order to function.

7 series devices also have an on-chip bitstream keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm implemented in hardware to provide additional security beyond that provided by the AES decryption alone. (See FIPS PUB 198-1, HMAC Federal Information Processing Standards at http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf.) The additional security provides cryptographically strong authentication of the decrypted bitstream to prove that not even a single bit was modified. Without knowledge of the AES and HMAC keys, the bitstream cannot be loaded, modified, intercepted, or cloned. AES provides the basic design security to protect the design from copying or reverse engineering, while HMAC provides assurance that the bitstream provided for the configuration of the FPGA was the unmodified bitstream allowed to load. Any bitstream tampering, including single bit flips, are detected.

The HMAC algorithm uses a key that is provided to the Xilinx software. Alternately, the software can automatically generate a random key. The HMAC key is separate and different from the AES key. The Xilinx software then utilizes the key and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) to generate a 256-bit result called the Message Authentication Code (MAC). The MAC and HMAC key are transmitted as part of the AES encrypted bitstream, verifying both data integrity and authenticity of the bitstream. Authentication covers the entire bitstream for all types of control and data. When used, the 7 series FPGA security solution always consists of both HMAC and AES.

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**Encrypted Bitstream Implementation Overview**

The following is a list of six fundamental steps needed to implement an encrypted design in a Xilinx 7 series FPGA:

1. Choose an AES key storage location: BBRAM or eFUSE; and corresponding security options (see XAPP1084 [Ref 1] for trade-off between BBRAM and eFUSE).
2. Implement the hardware requirements in your board design, based on your AES key storage selection.
3. Using Vivado Design Suite software, generate an AES key or provide your own custom AES and HMAC keys to the software (which is always the most secure approach) and encrypted bitstream.
4. Program the AES key into the FPGA using JTAG interface.
5. Program the encrypted bit file into the FPGA via JTAG or other configuration mode such as SPI or BPI, and ensure that the DONE pin asserts.

6. Perform hardware validation to ensure proper operation.

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Hardware Board Requirements

There are a few basic hardware requirements needed to implement an encrypted design flow:

- For programming ability and debugging capability: JTAG connector to FPGA.
- For BBRAM key storage: Battery to V\textsubscript{CCBATT} (see data sheet for battery voltage requirements)
- For eFUSE key storage: Recommend V\textsubscript{CCBATT} to V\textsubscript{CCAUX} to enable the ability to test with BBRAM flow prior to burning the eFUSEs.

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Software Requirements

Vivado Design Suite 2014.3.1 or newer is required.

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AES Key Storage

There are two options for AES key storage; Battery backed RAM (BBRAM) or eFUSE. When selecting the BBRAM or eFUSE storage options it is highly recommended that you consider the advantages and disadvantages of each option and which option fits your design requirements best. Refer to the following sections for details on each of their respective advantages and disadvantages. Additional information on each of these storage options can be found in the 7 Series FPGAs Configuration User Guide (UG470) [Ref 2].

**BBRAM**

When an encryption key is stored in the FPGA’s battery-backed RAM, the encryption key memory cells are volatile and must receive continuous power to retain their contents. During normal operation, these memory cells are powered by the auxiliary voltage input (V\textsubscript{CCAUX}). A separate V\textsubscript{CCBATT} power input is recommended for retaining the key when V\textsubscript{CCAUX} is removed. Therefore it is recommended that the AES key be programmed in-system on a board that has the battery back-up. Otherwise, the key is lost when power/battery is removed. BBRAM storage location advantages and disadvantages are identified in Table 1.
eFUSE

eFUSE is a nonvolatile one-time-programmable technology used for selected configuration settings. The fuse link is programmed (or burned or blown) by flowing a large current for a specific amount of time. User-programmable eFUSEs can be programmed with the Xilinx configuration tools. Again it is important to mention that eFUSE bits are one-time programmable (OTP). After they are programmed, they cannot be unprogrammed. For example, if access to a register is disabled, it cannot be re-enabled. The FPGA logic can access only the FUSE_USER register value. All other eFUSE bits are not accessible from the FPGA logic. eFUSE storage location advantages and disadvantages are identified in Table 2.

Table 2: eFUSE Storage Location Advantages and Disadvantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- No external battery required</td>
<td>- Permanent: Key can NOT be cleared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- If the CFG_AES_Only security eFUSE bit is set, only a bitstream encrypted with the eFUSE key can be loaded into the FPGA</td>
<td>- Less secure than BBRAM solution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: eFUSE Register Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register Name</th>
<th>Size (Bits)</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUSE_KEY</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>Bitstream encryption key [0:255] (bit 255 shifted first)</td>
<td>Stores a key for use by AES bitstream decryptor. The eFUSE key can be used instead of the key stored in battery-backed SRAM. The AES key is used by the 7 series FPGA decryption engine to load encrypted bitstreams. Depending on the read/write access bits in the CNTL register, the AES key can be programmed and read through the JTAG port.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eFUSE Control Register (FUSE_CNTL) Description

This register contains user programmable bits. These bits, described in Table 4, are used to select AES key usage and set the read/write protection for other eFUSE registers.

### Table 4: eFUSE Control Register Bit Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Index No.</th>
<th>FUSE_CNTL Bit Name</th>
<th>Description of eFUSE Control Bit</th>
<th>Recommended Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>CFG_AES_Only</td>
<td>• Configure using AES decryptor only.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• When programmed to 1, this bit forces use of AES key stored in eFUSE.</td>
<td>(recommended to keep as 0 pending customer security requirements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• When not programmed (0), use of the AES decryptor, or not, is selected by the bitstream's</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>security options.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**CAUTION! If this bit is programmed to 1, the device cannot be used unless the AES key is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>known. Return material authorization (RMA) returns cannot be accepted and the Vivado tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect SPI/BPI flash programming flow cannot be used if this bit is programmed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AES_Exclusive</td>
<td>• When programmed to 1, this bit disables partial reconfiguration from external configuration</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>interfaces.</td>
<td>(keep as 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• When not programmed (0), partial reconfiguration is allowed from external interfaces but the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>partial bitstream must be encrypted with a matching key.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**CAUTION! If this bit is programmed to 1, return material authorization (RMA) returns are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>limited in device analysis and debug. Instead, set the bitstream Security to Level2 which also</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disables partial configuration from external interfaces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When FUSE_CNTL[0] is NOT programmed:

- Encryption can be enabled or disabled via the bitstream options.
- The AES key stored in eFUSE or battery-backed RAM can be selected via the bitstream options.

**CAUTION!** When FUSE_CNTL[0] is programmed, only bitstreams encrypted with the eFUSE key can be used to configure the FPGA through external configuration ports. This precludes device configuration from Xilinx test bitstreams and Xilinx pre-built bitstreams. Thus, Xilinx does not support RMA requests nor Vivado tools indirect SPI/BPI flash programming for devices that have the FUSE_CNTL[0] bit programmed.
External configuration ports are blocked from accessing the configuration memory after initial configuration if FUSE_CNTL[1] is programmed. The only way to reconfigure the device is to power cycle, issue a JPROGRAM or IProg command, or pulse the PROGRAM_B pin.

Creating an Encryption Key and Encrypted Bitstream

The bitstream generator (write_bitstream), provided with the Vivado tools, can generate encrypted as well as non-encrypted bitstreams. For AES bitstream encryption, set the write_bitstream property to enable bitstream encryption. You can either specify a 256-bit key as an input to the bitstream generator or you can have the Vivado tool generate a pseudo-random key for you. The bitstream generator in turn generates an encrypted bitstream file (.BIT) and an encryption key file (.NKY). Table 5 shows the write_bitstream properties available to be defined in the XDC file and their corresponding descriptions.

Table 5: Write_bitstream Encryption Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Write_bitstream Property</th>
<th>Default Values</th>
<th>Possible Values</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.ENCRYPT</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No–Yes</td>
<td>Encrypts the bitstream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.ENCRYPTKEYSELECT</td>
<td>bbram</td>
<td>BBRAM, eFUSE</td>
<td>Determines the location of the AES encryption key to be used, either from the battery-backed RAM (BBRAM) or the eFUSE register. <strong>Note:</strong> This property is only available when the Encrypt option is set to Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.HKEY</td>
<td>Pick</td>
<td>Pick, &lt;hexstring&gt;</td>
<td>HKEY sets the HMAC authentication key for bitstream encryption. 7 series devices have an on-chip bitstream-keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm implemented in hardware to provide additional security beyond AES decryption alone. These devices require both AES and HMAC keys to load, modify, intercept, or clone the bitstream. The pick setting tells the bitstream generator to select a pseudo-random number for the value. To use this option, you must first set Encrypt to Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.KEY0</td>
<td>Pick</td>
<td>Pick, &lt;hexstring&gt;</td>
<td>Key0 sets the AES encryption key for bitstream encryption. The pick setting tells the bitstream generator to select a pseudo-random number for the value. To use this option, you must first set Encrypt to Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.KEYFILE</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>&lt;string&gt;</td>
<td>Specifies the name of the input encryption file (with a .nky file extension). To use this option, you must first set Encrypt to Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.STARTCBC</td>
<td>Pick</td>
<td>Pick, &lt;32-bit hexstring&gt;</td>
<td>Sets the starting cipher block chaining (CBC) value. The pick setting enables selection of a pseudo-random number for the value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following is an example XDC file showing BBRAM Key storage and a custom user-defined AES key. These encryption properties are also available in the Edit Device Properties GUI.

```
24 #Encryption Settings
25
26 set_property BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.ENCRYPT YES [current_design]
27 set_property BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.ENCRYPTKEYSELECT BBRAM [current_design]
28 #set_property BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.ENCRYPTKEYSELECT eFUSE [current_design]
29 set_property BITSTREAM.ENCRYPTION.KEY0 256'h12345678ABCDDCBA1234578ABCDDCBA1234578ABCDDCBA1234578ABCDDCBA [current_design]
30
```

The NKY file generation occurs at the same time as bitstream generation. The NKY file takes the same top_level name as the bit file and is placed in the same implementation directory.

The NKY file format is:

```
KEY 0 <hex string> (256 bit AES key)
```

For example: (top.nky)

```
Device xc7k325t;
Key 0 12345678ABCDDCBA12345678ABCDDCBA12345678ABCDDCBA12345678ABCDDCBA;
Key StartCBC 7115e9aa80085ea3ed65d26d3a8ab608;
Key HMAC d293d51c6058430262b05521f8f67279c9abce27d5fcaefc839bbefaf46713cc;
```

---

**Loading an Encryption Key and Encrypted Bitstream**

The encryption key can only be loaded onto a device through the JTAG interface. The Vivado Device Programmer tool can accept the NKY file as an input and program the device with the key through JTAG, using a supported Xilinx programming cable. To program the key, the device enters a special key-access mode. In this mode, all FPGA memory, including the encryption key and configuration memory, is cleared. After the key is programmed and the key-access mode is exited, the key cannot be read out of the device by any means, and it cannot be reprogrammed without clearing the entire device. The key access mode is transparent to most users. The key can be programmed into the battery-backed RAM (BBRAM), which is powered by VCCAUX or VCCBATT, or into the eFUSE bits.

BBRAM key programming solutions include a Vivado Design Suite and JTAG cable.

**Note:** Any attempted read or write access to the BBRAM via JTAG causes the BBRAM contents to be cleared and the entire configuration of the FPGA to be erased prior to access being enabled (being able to enter key access mode).

eFUSE key programming solutions include:

- A Vivado Design Suite and JTAG cable
- Contact an authorized Xilinx distributor for availability of device programming services.
**Note:** For the eFUSE solution, it is also recommended to take the following precautions for in-system programming of the AES key:

- Prevent or clear the FPGA of a configured design to minimize power supply noise within the FPGA.
- If possible, stop board-level system clocks to also minimize system power supply noise.

After connection to a valid hardware target using the Vivado tools *HW_Manager*, right-click on the 7 series FPGA and select either *Program BBR Key...* (to use BBRAM storage) or *Program eFUSE Registers...* (to use eFUSE storage), depending on which storage option you have previously chosen (see Figure 1).

**BBRAM Key**

When the *Program BBR Key* is selected you have the ability to browse to the recently generated NKY file in the project directory. After you add the .NKY file, the key value appears in the AES key field as shown in Figure 2. This allows you to check the key value and verify that this is the correct key you intend to program into the device.

![Vivado Tools HW Manager Key Programming Selection](image1)

*Figure 1: Vivado Tools HW Manager Key Programming Selection*

![BBRAM Programming GUI](image2)

*Figure 2: BBRAM Programming GUI*
After successfully programming the NKY file into the FPGA via JTAG, the TCL console reports the following:

```tcl
set_property ENCRYPTION.FILE (C:/config/series-7/Encryption/encryption_test_325T.runs/impl_1/top.nky) [get_property PROGRAM.HW_BITSTREAM [lindex [get_hw_devices] 0]]
program_hw_devices -key {bbr} [lindex [get_hw_devices] 0]
INFO: [Labtools 27-3088] BBR Key programmed:
12345678ABCDDCBA12345678ABCDDCBA12345678ABCDDCBA
INFO: [Labtools 27-3087] Key programming succeeded
INFO: [Labtools 27-3087] Key programming succeeded
```

**Program eFUSE Registers**

When *Program eFUSE Registers* is selected, a Wizard appears and guides you through the process of selecting the NKY file and the eFUSE registers you want to program. The eFUSE Programming GUI/AES Key Setup is shown in Figure 3.

![Figure 3: eFUSE Programming GUI (AES Key Setup)](image)

**IMPORTANT:** For 7 series FPGAs, programming the AES key and the lower 8 bits [7:0] of the FUSE_USER register occurs at the same time. Therefore if you program the AES key and do not specify a pattern for the FUSE_USER [7:0] bits, they cannot be programmed at a later time. Similarly, if you program the lower FUSE_USER bits and not the AES key then you cannot program the key at a later time.

**RECOMMENDED:** Program all 32 bits of the FUSE_USER register when you program the AES key. Refer to Table 4, page 5 for a description of the FUSE_CNTL register bits. The eFUSE Programming GUI/Control Register Setup is shown in Figure 4.)
The Tcl commands for programming the eFUSE registers are as follows:

- AES Key and entire 32 bits of FUSE_USER:
  
  ```tcl
  program_hw_devices -key {efuse} -user_efuse {xxxxxxxx} [lindex [get_hw_devices] 0]
  ```

- FUSE_CNTL bits:
  
  ```tcl
  program_hw_devices -control_efuse {xxxxxx} [lindex [get_hw_devices] 0]
  ```

After the eFUSE registers have been successfully programmed you can see the values of the FUSE_CNTL and FUSE_USER registers in the Hardware Device Properties/EFUSE register dropdown menu (see **Figure 5**), or by typing the following Tcl commands into the Tcl console:

- For the FUSE_CNTL register:
  
  ```tcl
  report_property [lindex [get_hw_device] 0] REGISTER.EFUSE.FUSE_CNTL
  ```

- For the FUSE_USER register:
  
  ```tcl
  report_property [lindex [get_hw_device] 0] REGISTER.EFUSE.FUSE_USER
  ```
Loading the Encrypted Bitstream

After the device has been programmed with the correct encryption key, the device can be configured with an encrypted bitstream. After the configuration, it is not possible to read the configuration memory through JTAG or SelectMAP readback, regardless of the bitstream security setting. While the device holds an encryption key, a non-encrypted bitstream can be used to configure the device (only if the CFG_AES_ONLY bit is not programmed) and only after POR or PROGRAM_B is asserted, thus clearing out the configuration memory. In this case the key is ignored. After configuring with a non-encrypted bitstream, readback is possible (if allowed by the bitstream security setting). The encryption key still cannot be read out of the device, preventing the use of Trojan Horse bitstreams to defeat the 7 series FPGA encryption scheme.

Most methods of configuration are not affected by encryption. The 7 series FPGAs allow for bitstreams to be created with both compression and encryption. An encrypted bitstream can be delivered through any configuration interface: JTAG, serial, SPI, BPI, SelectMAP, and ICAPE2. However, an encrypted bitstream has a few limitations or timing differences for some of the configuration methods. The Slave SelectMAP and ICAPE2 interfaces accept encrypted bitstreams only through the x8 bus (x16 and x32 Slave SelectMAP are not allowed). The Master SelectMAP and Master BPI interfaces accept encrypted bitstreams through either the x8 or x16 data bus, but for the x16 bus width, the master CCLK frequency is slowed to half of the ConfigRate, or half of the EMCCCLK rate when ExtMasterCCLK_en is used. The slower CCLK begins early in the bitstream when the DEC (AES encryptor enable) bit is read, before the CCLK is updated based on the ConfigRate frequency or the external EMCCCLK frequency.

Advanced configuration solutions such as Tandem Configuration and Partial Reconfiguration are supported with encrypted bitstreams. Partial bitstreams can be delivered unencrypted to the ICAP, or encrypted (with the same AES key) to any configuration port, so long as the latter has not been explicitly forbidden by the designer. Setting Security Level2 (via set_property BITSTREAM.READBACK.SECURITY Level2 [current_design]) or programming the eFUSE_CNTL[1] AES_Excusive bit to a ‘1’ prevents partial reconfiguration over external configuration ports. Fallback reconfiguration and IPROG reconfiguration are enabled in 7 series FPGAs after encryption is turned on. Readback is available through the ICAPE2 primitive. None of these events reset the key if VCCBATT or VCCAUX is maintained. A mismatch between the key in the encrypted bitstream and the key stored in the device causes configuration to fail with the INIT_B pin pulsing Low and then back High if fallback is enabled, and the DONE pin remaining Low. The HMAC_ERROR bit in the Config_Status register also flags if an error occurs.

To confirm in hardware that the encrypted design loaded successfully, check that the DONE pin is High or verify using other visual indicators that your design is functioning (LEDs, UARTs, etc.). To confirm in software that the encrypted design loaded successfully you can refer to the Config_Status register included in the Hardware Device Properties list. Bits 1 (DECRYPTOR_ENABLE), 4 (EOS), and 14 (DONE_PIN) are the main indicators for confirmation (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Device Status Register
Hardware Verification

You will most likely want to verify that the AES key was properly programmed into either the BBRAM or eFUSE bits properly. The following is a check list of verification steps:

1. Generate bitstreams using Vivado Design Suite 2014.3.1 or later: Unencrypted bitstream, encrypted bitstream with your personalized key, encrypted bitstream with an all-ones key, finally an encrypted bitstream with an all-zeros key

2. Review the generated bitstreams to validate encryption took place. (See Figure 7, page 15 for an example of encrypted and unencrypted bit files.)

3. On an FPGA that has not yet had its eFUSE programmed:
   a. Check hardware: Use Vivado Device Programmer to connect to the FPGA, download the unencrypted BIT file via JTAG. Does the design function as expected?
   b. Test FPGA decryptor: Download the encrypted BIT file with the all-zeros key (for eFUSE).
   c. Test encrypted bitstream security: Download the encrypted BIT file with your personalized key. A configuration failure is expected.

4. Program the eFUSE key and options:
   a. Power-cycle the board to assure any errors from the above tests have been cleared from the FPGA and that the FPGA is not configured.
   b. Program the AES key via JTAG. (If using eFUSE, first do steps 3b and 3c with the BBRAM key as a validation check. Then program the eFUSE for a final test.)
   c. Check key cannot be read: Use the Vivado tool to check the Hardware Device>Property>Registers>eFUSE>FUSE_CNTL and that bit 3 is programmed to 1. Also, check that the other FUSE_CNTL bits are programmed as selected during the programming operation.

5. On the FPGA with the programmed eFUSE key and options:
   a. Test key: Download the encrypted BIT file with your personalized key.
   b. Test key: Download encrypted BIT file associated with the all-zeros key. A configuration failure is expected.
   c. Test key settings: Download the unencrypted BIT file. Results vary depending on security settings.

Conclusion

This application note describes AES encryption and authentication standards and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of the different key storage options available. Most importantly, it functions as an easy how to guide to create an AES encryption key and an encrypted bit file and to program these files into a 7 series FPGA using Vivado Design Suite software.
The difference between an encrypted bit file and unencrypted bit file is shown in Figure 7.

Appendix A: Encrypted and Unencrypted Bitstreams

### Encrypted bit file

| 00000700  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000710  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000720  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000730  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 00000740  | AA 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 |
| 00000750  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 00000760  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 00000770  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |

### Unencrypted bit file

| 00000780  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000790  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000800  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000810  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000820  | FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 00000830  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 00000840  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 00000850  | 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |

Figure 7: Encrypted and Unencrypted Bit Files
References

1. Developing Tamper Resistant Designs with Xilinx Virtex-6 and 7 Series FPGAs (XAPP1084)
2. 7 Series FPGAs Configuration User Guide (UG470)

Revision History

The following table shows the revision history for this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07/16/2018</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Changed “configuration” to “reconfiguration” in Table 4. Clarified third paragraph under Loading the Encrypted Bitstream.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/15/2015</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Xilinx initial release.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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