Summary

The Zynq® UltraScale+™ MPSoC provides multiple processing subsystems including an application processing unit containing four Cortex™-A53 cores (APU subsystem), two Cortex-R5 cores (RPU subsystem), a platform management unit (PMU), as well as a configuration security unit (CSU). A user-specified number of MicroBlaze™ processors are located in the programmable logic (PL). When multiple software teams are involved in system development, these processing units can potentially interfere with each other. In order to prevent the possibility of such interference, isolation is necessary. Due to the nature of security and functional safety applications, isolation is a requirement.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides the Xilinx® memory protection unit (XMPU) and the Xilinx peripheral protection unit (XPPU) for hardware protection of memory and peripherals. These protection units complement the isolation provided by TrustZone (TZ), by the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC memory management units (MMUs) and the System Memory Management Unit (SMMU). The methods outlined in this document allow a system to be built using a structured isolation methodology. This application note describes how to isolate the subsystems in a Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC system using XMPU, XPPU, and TZ.

The reference design files for this application note can be downloaded from the Xilinx website. For detailed information about the design files, see Design Files.

Note: This application note targets MPSoC devices as an example. All isolation methods discussed in this application note are also applicable to RFSoC devices.

Introduction

Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC designs use multiple subsystems. The subsystems include one or more central processing units (CPUs) or other masters, memories, and peripherals. Interference occurs when a master in one subsystem accesses a memory region or peripheral that it is not intended to access. Interference can result from software bugs or from a malicious actor.

In this application note, the isolation methods in the Vivado® design suite defines a system that uses isolated subsystems. The subsystems are the application processing unit (APU), real-time processing unit (RPU), and PMU. The objective of these methods is to ensure that each subsystem executes with freedom from interference (FFI) from other subsystems. These methods configure the protection units and TZ for subsystem isolation. The system hardware generated in the Vivado design suite is exported to the Xilinx Software Development Kit (SDK), that creates system software. In addition to the basic software that runs on subsystems, SDK can
be used to create applications that control and monitor the protection unit and TZ functionality. The software allows the developer to include an error reaction to interference of a subsystem.

After a system is defined and implemented, it needs to be validated for basic functionality of the subsystems, including any subsystem intercommunication. The isolation between subsystems can be verified by injecting faults that invoke protection unit and TZ isolation functionality. This includes testing of the error reaction to the interference defined by the system architect.

This application note targets a bare metal system but the methodology provides a framework for isolation development in systems that use operating systems. This application note includes:

- **UltraScale MPSoC Architecture**
- **Isolation Tools**
- **Known Limitations to Isolation**

### Hardware and Software Requirements

The hardware and software requirements for the reference design system include:

- Xilinx ZCU102 evaluation platform
- Two USB type-A to USB mini-B cables (for UART, JTAG communication)
- Secure Digital (SD) memory card
- Xilinx SDK 2019.1
- Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2019.1
- Serial communication terminal software (such as Tera Term or PuTTY)
- Warm restart patch required. For more information, see [Software Patch Requirements](#) (2019.1/2019.2).
UltraScale MPSoC Architecture

This section discusses the hardware components in the UltraScale+ MPSoC architecture that are used to create subsystems and the protection units used to ensure FFI. At a high level, Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs consist of a processing system (PS) and programmable logic (PL). Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC regions are also defined by power domains, including the full power domain (FPD) and low power domain (LPD) regions. Within these power domains are islands whose power can be controlled by the user.

There are also four fundamental memory regions. These memory regions are the double data rate (DDR) memory, on-chip memory (OCM), tightly-coupled memory (TCM), and advanced eXtensible interface (AXI) block RAM in the PL. Access to memory is controlled by the memory controllers, direct memory access controllers (DMACs), memory management units (MMUs), and the XMPUs. The peripherals, mostly in the LPD, include devices in the input/output unit (IOU), and other devices such as the gigabit Ethernet MAC (GEM). The GEM and USB peripherals function as both master and slave AXI devices. Access to the peripherals can be dedicated or shared. However, when a peripheral is shared it is up to the user to arbitrate access. Isolation of the peripherals is provided using the XPPU.

Figure 1 shows the location of the XMPUs and the XPPU in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC. There are eight XMPUs. Six of the XMPUs protect transactions into the DDR, one protects the OCM, and one protects transactions into the FPD. There is one XPPU, which is located at the input to the LPD.
The hardware provides other components that can be used for isolation: system memory management unit (SMMU), AXI timeout blocks (ATBs), AXI isolation blocks (AIBs), and TZ. The SMMU provides memory management for non-CPU masters such as direct memory access controllers (DMACs). The SMMU provides isolation between two different processors that have access to the same memory and the SMMU is commonly used in conjunction with hypervisors. The ATBs ensure that AXI transactions for which there is not a slave response do not halt. The AIBs facilitate the transition to a powered down state for regions that are powered down. Powering down unused regions is important in isolation.
Several types of access control need to be used in conjunction with the protection units and TZ. AXI transactions can be either read or write. However, a section with code or data constants should not allow writes. To accommodate this isolation requirement, a memory region’s read/write permissions can be defined using TZ and the Xilinx protection units (XMPU and XPPU).

**Note:** While the protection units use the master IDs to enforce isolation, TZ achieves this using the AXI AxProt bits.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC APU is an Arm® v8 architecture and as such supports four exception levels. These exception levels are used to control privileges at the application level (i.e., each application has its own exception level). The Arm® v8 architecture exception levels (ELs) are exclusively for applications running on the APU. The RPU and PMU do not support them. However, the RPU supports modes to control privilege and it is similar to the concept of exception levels. For more information, see [https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0024/latest/fundamentals-of-armv8/changing-exception-levels#BEIJHGDA](https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0024/latest/fundamentals-of-armv8/changing-exception-levels#BEIJHGDA).

Powering down unused regions and islands is a valuable tool not just for isolation but also for general security and safety practices. A component cannot interfere with other components if it is powered down. Figure 2 shows an overview of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC power islands.
Figure 2: Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Power Domains
Isolation Tools

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC has many tools to aid in the development of an isolated design. The primary tools are discussed here.

TrustZone

The isolation methods in this application note rely on the use of protection units and TZ. Protection units provide isolation by detecting violating AXI transactions. Xilinx differentiates between the isolation provided by the protection units and isolation provided by TZ using the terms transaction isolation and state isolation, respectively. State isolation can be more comprehensive than transaction isolation. With state isolation, the processor, IP, memory, and interrupts in subsystems are assigned secure world (SW) or non-secure world (NSW) settings. The subsystem can context switch between SW and NSW states, thereby improving device utilization at the expense of software complexity.

The reference design provides a critical framework to start using TZ. Because of its complexity, realization of all the advantages of TZ typically requires running a trusted execution environment (TEE) and support from a Xilinx ecosystem partner. For more information, see Isolate Security-Critical Applications on Zynq UltraScale+ Devices (WP516) [Ref 5]. In the included reference system (see Figure 13), the APU and its memory and peripherals are TZ non-secure while the RPU and PMU along with their dedicated memory and peripherals are TZ secure. While sharing is allowed (not typically recommended), the level must be consistent with the level of the master. For example, a non-secure master cannot access a secure memory or peripheral. However, a secure master can access either a secure or non-secure memory or peripheral.

In the typical Arm use case, TZ uses hardware and software functionality to provide isolation. TZ defines SW and NSW operational states. Because functional safety (FS) applications sometimes have isolation requirements analogous to security applications, FS applications use the terms safety critical and non-safety critical in lieu of secure and non-secure, respectively. For brevity, the terms safe world and non-safe world will be used so as to keep the same acronym as the security context (secure world and non-secure world) because they are analogous.

The intent is to ensure that safety critical functions cannot be corrupted by non-safety critical functions. In some, but not all TZ systems, the same CPU multiplexes between the SW and NSW because that is an efficient use of resources. This usually requires a relatively complex context switch. In the general case, however, trusted software runs in the SW using a standalone board support package (BSP) or a small operating system in the SW. NSW software runs on a rich operating system, often Linux, which generally has a wider attack surface.

As an example, secure boot, secure firmware update, key management, reset control, power management, and other critical system functions are performed in the SW. Non-critical applications such as status reporting, non-essential analytics, and performance monitoring are performed in the NSW as a Linux application. The isolation provided by TZ minimizes the probability that a cyber attack or software bug in the NSW affects code or data in the SW.
Because the context switch between code running in a SW and a NSW is complex, it is easier if one CPU is statically configured to operate in the SW, and a second CPU is statically configured to operate in the NSW. With the number of CPUs provided in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC, this is a viable option. As an example, the R5-0 can operate statically in the SW while the A53-0 operates statically in the NSW.

In TZ, masters, slaves, and memory are designated to function in either the SW or the NSW. A master in the SW has access to slave and memory belonging to both the SW and the NSW (i.e., everything). A master in the NSW has access to slave and memory belonging only to the NSW. An access attempt by a NSW master to a SW peripheral or memory is not allowed. The illegal access will be rejected by the slave, generally with a SLVERR or DECERR response.

The TZ hardware isolation on the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC uses the AxPROT[1] signal on the AXI bus as the filtering mechanism to determine if an access is legal. This is used on both the Arm advanced high-performance bus (AHB) and the advanced peripheral bus (APB) in the PS. The AXI interconnect IP used in the PL also supports AxPROT[1] allowing relatively straightforward TZ isolation in the PL\(^{(1)}\). While the soft MicroBlaze processor and AXI IP do not support SW/NSW operating states, the custom logic to add the AxPROT signals is relatively simple.

**System Protection Units**

The Arm TrustZone technology tags the security level of each AXI transaction as described in more detail in TrustZone. The XMPU and the XPPU verify that a specific system master is explicitly allowed to access an address by assigning specific addresses ranges (memories and peripherals) to either the secure world or non-secure world TrustZone tags.

**XMPU**

Fundamental to any secure or functionally safe system is the isolation of memory. The XMPU gives the user the ability to partition user-defined regions of memory and allocate them to specific isolated subsystems. Figure 3 shows a functional diagram of the XMPU.

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1. It is up to the user to design cores that make use of these bits.
There are six XMPUs at the input to the DDRC interface and one XMPU at the input to the OCM. There is also an XMPU at the input of the FPD interconnect for protection of FPD controllers (SATA and PCIe®). The XMPU configuration generated by the Vivado tools is exported to the first stage boot loader (FSBL). It is the FSBL that sets up the isolation configuration registers. As an additional safety or security check, these registers can be read to verify their state. As part of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC functional safety software test library (STL), Xilinx provides the capability to run self tests on the XMPU. These libraries are located in the Functional Safety Lounge(1). Each XMPU protects up to 16 regions, with regions aligned on either 1 MB (DDR) or 4 KB (OCM) boundaries. For each region, the memory protection is based on two checks:

- The address of the transaction is within the region defined by START_ADDR and END_ADDR.
- The master ID of the incoming transaction is allowed.

While it is possible to reconfigure these registers at runtime, it is not recommended for safe or secure systems. Such systems typically require these registers to be locked. This is recommended for the XPPU, but not for the XMPU. A conflict exists where locking the XMPU configuration prevents any interrupts from it from being cleared (the register to clear interrupts is also locked). Due to this conflict, the reference design added an additional subsystem, the

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PMU, to be the XMPU master. In this example, the XMPU configuration is not locked but is only writable by the PMU subsystem. Framework code for the PMU is provided as an interrupt handler. This framework allows for additional code to be added based upon the user's error reaction requirements.

**Note:** This conflict only exists for the XMPU. The XPPU can be locked without affecting the ability to clear an interrupt.

The START_ADDR, END_ADDR, and master ID (MID) values are defined in the system setup and readable in the XMPU register space. While the APU has a single master ID, the RPU has two possibilities. If configured in lock-step mode, a single R5 master ID is used. If configured in split mode, each R5 has its own master ID. If an access violates any of the protection criteria, the XMPU prevents this access by applying a poisoning method.

If an illegal transaction is attempted, the XMPU asserts AxUser[10] but the transaction is passed to the memory controller. This mechanism is referred to as *poison by attribute*. The transaction is gated by the end point, not the XMPU itself. In the case of the DDR, the user has choices of how to deal with the invalid transaction (none of which actually allow it). While there is a second way of poisoning the transaction (by address), poisoning by attribute is recommended for the XMPU.

Optionally, the XMPU can generate an interrupt such that an error reaction can be included in the interrupt handler. See the “System Protection Unit” chapter in the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] for additional information on the XMPU.

**XPPU**

The XPPU allows for protecting peripherals, message buffers, inter-processor interrupts (IPI) and communications, as well as Quad SPI flash memory. It is best deployed at the system “choke points” where all traffic to the protected objects will pass through, thus maximizing the protection coverage. In comparison with the XMPU, the XPPU uses finer grained address matching and provides more address apertures. Additionally, where the XMPU discourages the use of address poisoning in lieu of attribute poisoning, the XPPU only allows address poisoning. The address poisoning approach is shown in Figure 3 on the left side. The violating access is deviated to a certain memory area that is reserved for this purpose. A master ID list is used to define the masters that are allowed to access peripherals. Eight of the 20 master IDs are predefined. An aperture permission list (APL) specifies permissions on peripheral addresses that masters can access. Permissions are based on master ID.

A functional diagram of the XPPU is shown in Figure 4.
Both the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSOC Processing System LogiCORE IP Product Guide (PG201) [Ref 3] and Zynq UltraScale+ MPSOC Technical Reference Manual (UG1085) [Ref 2] provide additional information on the master ID and aperture permission lists, permission checking, and error handling.

**Memory Management and Protection Units**

In addition to the Xilinx Protection Units, the Arm Cortex R5 and A53 systems have typical memory protection (memory protection unit and memory management unit, respectively) allowing for additional access control within each processor complex. A highlight is given here but more detail can be found in the respective technical reference manuals.

The memory protection unit (MPU) of the Arm Cortex R5 allows for creating 0, 12, or 16 memory regions. This allows for individual protection attributes to be set for each region. Each region is defined by the base address and size. Overlapping of regions is allowed where sharing a specific address space is desired. Additionally, the the memory management unit (MMU) in the ARMv8 architecture supports two-stage translation, which allows the users’ OS and hypervisor to have their own translation stages.

Each Arm Cortex A53 allows for more granular region definition. Rather than specify the number of regions, it specifies the granularity of a region (4 KB or 64 KB). Each address region is assigned its own ID (ASID).

The Xilinx system memory management unit (SMMU) extends the MMU capability of the processor cores into the rest of the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSOC architecture for any other master/DMA capable devices using six translation buffer units (TBUs). A high-level usage diagram can be seen in Figure 5.
AXI Isolation Block

Originally intended to isolate a master from its slave in preparation for powering down, the AXI isolation blocks (AIBs) can be used to enhance isolation. These blocks are spread throughout the entire PS of the device. They can be configured to block undesired accesses and generate a SLVERR response when an illegal access is attempted. The control registers for the AIB can be protected by the XPPU.

Exception Levels

The ARMv8 architecture allows for setting up four exception levels (EL0 – EL3) allowing for additional access control within the Arm A53 complex. These exception levels are best described as follows:

- **EL0**: Lowest software execution privilege (Sometimes referred to as the unprivileged execution level). User applications typically run at this level.
- **EL1**: First true “privileged” level. Operating systems typically run at this level. This level provides basic support for the non-secure state.
- **EL2**: Higher level of privilege adding support for processor virtualization. Hypervisors typically run at this level. This level provides support for processor virtualization.
- **EL3**: Most privileged level adding support for a secure state. Secure monitor code runs at this level. For the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC, this is the Arm Trusted Firmware (ATF).
A graphical depiction of this structure (along with TrustZone) is shown in Figure 6.

**Figure 6: Armv8 Exception Levels with TrustZone**

**Interprocessor Communication**

Most systems, even with isolation, require some sort of communication between subsystems. As an example, the APU subsystem can support an Ethernet interface that receives and transmits data from or to a server for both the APU and RPU subsystems. The RPU subsystem can generate log files and transmit them to the APU subsystem, which then transfers them to the server using Ethernet. Similarly, a server can send commands to the RPU subsystem using the APU subsystem Ethernet, which then uses the inter-subsystem communication mechanism to transfer the command to the RPU subsystem.

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides IPI buffers to support interprocessor communication between the APU, RPU, and PMU subsystems. The exchange between the APU, RPU, and PMU subsystems uses 32-byte request and response buffers. Figure 7 shows one specific example using interprocessor communication between the APU and RPU subsystems using IPI in the reference design. This is just one example using IPI. Communication can be initiated by all participants of the IPI system. See the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] for more information on using IPI.
The protocol for the message exchange is for the requesting subsystem (APU) to trigger an interrupt to the receiving subsystem (RPU). The interrupt triggering subsystem fills the data in the IPI channel’s request buffer. The RPU interrupt receiving master reads the content of the request buffer. If the interrupt receiving master needs to provide response data to the interrupt triggering master, the response buffer is used. The response buffer is read by the triggering master (APU).

The Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC provides eleven IPI channels for inter-subsystem communication. Out of the eleven, channels 3 – 6 are dedicated to the PMU, and the remaining are configurable as masters. The inter-subsystem communication is supported in hardware and uses the xipipsu device driver. Each channel provides six registers used to trigger the interrupt and check status. Figure 8 shows the hardware support for interprocessor interrupts in the Vivado design suite. For the purposes of this lab, the default settings will be used.

Figure 7: Interprocessor Communication Using IPI
Handling Interrupts with the PMU

The XMPU and XPPU optionally generate an interrupt when there is a memory or peripheral access violation. The system can be set up so that the interrupt is connected to either the APU GIC, RPU GIC, or AXI INTC, allowing an interrupt handler to be implemented by the APU, RPU, or PMU.

The error reaction in the interrupt handler is defined by the system requirements. For example, in one system, the reaction might be to power down the system and require intervention to restart the system. In another system, in which availability is a prevalent requirement, the system might remain functional. In this case, the error reaction might be to log the error, notify a server for possible scheduled maintenance, and continue operation.

Figure 9 shows the PMU FW code for handling an error. The file shown is xpfw_xpu.c and can be found under the BSP tree in SDK. The message (shown later) is printed from the XPfw_Xpu_IntrHandler function. This handler can be modified to implement the required error reaction.
Fault Injection/Application Fault Error Handling

For functional safety and security systems, it is not sufficient to add safe or secure features without testing that such features work. For functional features, this is straightforward (if it runs it works). However, for security or safety related features, system functionality is proof of nothing because such features might only be noticeable in the presence of a fault. Because it is not practical to wait for a fault to happen, it is typically necessary to inject faults into the system. In the example design, it will be necessary to prove isolation by attempting to violate it.

To verify isolation between multiple isolation regions, faults will be injected by writing code to perform illegal memory and peripheral accesses through TZ protected XMPU and XPPU gates, and verifying that such accesses are blocked and notification is given to the system. Additional symbols will be added to the PMU code to enable detailed error messaging while additional error handling routines will be added to the application code to allow it to run through an isolated violation. However, these symbols are optional and only for outputting error messages to the UARTs. They are not required or even desired in a real-world system.

To allow the application that is performing the illegal reads and writes, it is necessary to construct an error handler to deal with it. This allows the application to run through the fault rather than end abruptly. How a system handles interrupts is entirely up to the developer and
the system requirements for interrupt handling. This example is best used for demonstration and as a placeholder for the actual user code.

The example application running in the APU domain generates two types of interrupts: sync and error aborts. The actual error type depends on the corresponding transaction type (read or write). Each must have their own handler. The error type depends on the transaction type: read or write. The requirements for two types of errors comes from the Arm architecture itself, not the Xilinx-specific implementation. Figure 10 shows the error handler code for both. For sync aborts, the code sets a Boolean variable, letting the main routine know an abort happened. It then steps forward one instruction to prevent a loop when returning to the same offending statement. Error aborts simply log that an abort happened. The application determines if the statement “passed” or “failed” depending upon the value of this Boolean. Figure 11 shows the code to register the custom handlers. A similar handler for the RPU system was also generated but it only required the sync error handler because only one interrupt type is generated in that system. These handlers are for demonstration purposes and not what would be expected in a real-world system. How to handle such errors is up to the developer and the requirements of the system being developed.

```c
void SAbort_SyncIntHandler(int Data) {
    exceptionDetected = true;
    usleep(DELAY_COUNT);
    //update the return address to prevent returning to the same offending read transaction
    asm volatile("mov x1, ELR_EL3");
    asm volatile("add x1, x0, #4");
    asm volatile("mrs ELR_EL3, x1");
    return;
}

void SAbort_ErrorAbortIntHandler(int Data) {
    exceptionDetected = true;
    usleep(DELAY_COUNT);
    return;
}
```

**Figure 10:** Application Interrupt Handlers

```c
static int SetupInterruptSystem(void) {
    //Connect the interrupt controller interrupt handler to the hardware
    //interrupt handling logic in the ARM processor.
    Xil_ExceptionRegisterHandler(XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_SYNC_INT,
                               (Xil_ExceptionHandler) SAbort_SyncIntHandler,
                               XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_SYNC_INT);
    Xil_ExceptionRegisterHandler(XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_ERROR_ABORT_INT,
                               (Xil_ExceptionHandler) SAbort_ErrorAbortIntHandler,
                               XIL_EXCEPTION_ID_ERROR_ABORT_INT);

    //Enable interrupts in the ARM
    Xil_ExceptionEnable();
    return 0;
}
```

**Figure 11:** Application Interrupt Handler Registration
Known Limitations to Isolation

There are some limitations to isolation that the user must be aware of. These limitations are documented here.

**A-53 cores**

There are use cases where it is desirable to physically isolate each core of the quad A-53 processor complex. However, unlike the cores of the R-5 processor complex, each A53 core has the same master ID. This makes it impossible to use features like XMPU and XPPU to isolate them. If such isolation is desired, it must to be implemented at a software level, using either a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) or a hypervisor.

**CCI-400**

While useful to keep transactions coherent, it must be pointed out that the CCI-400 IP is capable of mastering its own transactions. This creates a potential conflict as it generates these transactions using the same master ID as the R5_0 processor core. This can result in isolation errors. The *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] recommends adding the R5_0 to the access list of the memory region whose transactions are being mastered by the CCI-400. While this addresses the access error, it is not typically practical in an isolation use case. The following options can resolve this issue:

1. Add R5_0, as the *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Technical Reference Manual* (UG1085) [Ref 2] suggests, to the memory region whose transactions are mastered by the CCI-400. This prevents the error but has implications to isolation that must be dealt with.

2. Move the R5_0 application over to the R5_1 core and keep R5_0 either unused or capable of being in the same isolation region as the memory region whose transactions are driven by the CCI-400.

3. Disable Cache Coherency for the region being protected by an XMPU.

**XMPU Configuration Locking**

The XMPU lock bit over protects the configuration; it protects the bit that clears interrupts. This makes it impractical to lock the configuration as any access violation would not be able to be addressed as the interrupt cannot be cleared. To address this limitation, it is recommended that the user make the PMU the master and make it its own isolation system. While the XMPU configuration may not be locked, it is protected from access by any master other than the PMU.
The first step in developing a system on the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC is defining the functionality in terms of the architecture. This means defining the tasks performed in the APU, RPU, and PL. In most systems, there is a joint requirement that the subsystems be isolated to perform their tasks without interference.

It is quite common for subsystems to require some level of communication between them. To support this and maintain isolation between them, there are two common methods: inter-processor interrupt (IPI) and shared memory. IPI relies on a common message buffer and integrated interrupt system while shared memory creates a partition of memory shared between the two subsystems. In IPI, the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC architecture handles the notification of the messages while shared memory requires the user to create a similar notification architecture. Each method has its merits depending upon user requirements.

In some cases, there are reasons for subsystems to share resources. Device configuration is a good example where non-volatile memory (NVM) stores the boot image for all subsystems, loaded at power-up. Another example is the DDR controller (DDRC). While it is possible to add an AXI DDRC in the PL, this increases the resources used, which increases the cost. The isolation is increased, but the effect of using the added DDRC resources on reliability is less clear.

When using development boards such as the ZCU102 or UltraZed-EG, there might be constraints in the resources used by each subsystem. The multiplexed I/O (MIO) and device board interfaces might present resource limitations that do not exist on a custom board. This reference design specifically targets the ZCU102 development board.

**Software Patch Requirements (2019.1/2019.2)**

There is an issue discovered in 2019.1 and 2019.2 where the warm restart function conflicts with isolation. To support warm restart, the PMU copies the FSBL to DDR. This causes two key conflicts:

- It requires the PMU to read OCM in this reference design, to which it does not have access.
- Violates security tenets if authentication and/or encryption are used for the FSBL.
  - Copies the FSBL outside of the chip in DDR without encrypting it.
  - Copies the hash of the FSBL for integrity but stores that hash outside in DDR as well.

For more information, see AR73475. The following patches are required for this lab:

- 0001-sw_apps-zynqmp_fsbl-Fix-logic-in-writing-FSBL-running.patch
- 0002-sw_apps-zynqmp_pmufw-Make-FSBL-copy-as-user-option.patch

When installed, open the `xpfw_config.h` file and change the value of `USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL` from (1) to (0) as shown in Figure 12. While it is possible to make this change on a project by project basis, failure to disable this option (which is enabled by default) can cause isolation errors in most isolated systems. It is recommended to disable it.
in the patch repository rather than in each PMU firmware project. The `xpfw_config.h` file can be found at `<local patch repository>/embeddedsw/lib/sw_apps/zynqmp_pmufw/src`.

```
#define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_2_VAL 1U
#define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_3_VAL 1U
#define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_4_VAL 1U
#define CONNECT_PMU_GPO_5_VAL 1U
#define SECURE_ACCESS_VAL 0U
#define USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL 0U
```

**Figure 12:** Altered USE_DDR_FOR_APU_RESTART_VAL Option in 2019.1 Patch

**Note:** For more information on installing patches, see Answer Record 72710. While a patch for 2019.2 is shown above, this lab targets 2019.1. 2019.2 uses Vitis (not SDK) and will be addressed in a future version of this document.
System Overview

Figure 13 shows the reference system, which consists of three subsystems. In this design, the APU subsystem is considered a non-secure system (colored green) while the PMU and RPU subsystems are both considered secure systems (colored red). Where non-secure regions are shared with secure masters they are colored both red and green.

The reference system partitions the PS as follows:

- The DDR is split into three regions. The APU subsystem owns addresses 0x0000_0000 to 0x01FF_FFFF and shares 0x6000_0000 to 0x600F_FFFF with the RPU subsystem. The region 0x4000_0000 to 0x40FF_FFFF is owned by the RPU subsystem.
- OCM is split in two regions. Address range 0xFFFC_0000 to 0xFFFF_0000 is owned by the RPU subsystem, while the remaining addresses (0xFFFF_0000 to 0xFFFF_FFFF) are shared between the APU and RPU subsystems.
- The R5 owns the entire R5_0_ATCM region.
- The APU subsystem owns TTC0 and SWDT0, while sharing GPIO with the RPU subsystem and UART0 with the PMU subsystem. The RPU subsystem owns TTC1, SWDT1, and I2C1, and shares UART1 with the PMU subsystem.
A more detailed address map is shown in Table 1.

**Table 1: System Address Map**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>A53-0</th>
<th>OCM</th>
<th>NSW R/W</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0xFFFF_0000</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x0000_0000</td>
<td>32 MB</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x6000_0000</td>
<td>1 MB</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>UART0</th>
<th>GPIO</th>
<th>SW R/W</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>R5-0</th>
<th>OCM</th>
<th>SW R/W</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0xFFFF_0000</td>
<td>192 KB</td>
<td>SW R/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0xFFFF_0000</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x4000_0000</td>
<td>16 MB</td>
<td>SW R/W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x6000_0000</td>
<td>1 MB</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>R5_0_ATCM_GLOBAL</th>
<th>SW R/W</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SW R/W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>UART0</th>
<th>CRF_APB</th>
<th>SW R/W</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
<td>SW R/W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsystem</th>
<th>PMU</th>
<th>UART0</th>
<th>SW R/W</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
<td>NSW R/W</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For secure and safe systems using XMPU and XPPU for isolation, it is desirable to protect their configuration to prevent errant software or an adversary from modifying these settings and compromising the intended isolation. This can be done with either of the following:

- The `psu_protection_lock` function in the PMU Firmware can be called.
- The XMPU/XPPU lock bits can be set.
- The FPD_XMPU protection can be used.

However, due to the conflict described in XMPU, it is not recommended to lock the XMPU. It is better, as demonstrated in the reference design, to add the XMPU to a secure master such as the PMU.

**Building The Hardware Platform**

Isolation in the UltraScale+ MPSoC family is rooted in hardware. As such, the configuration of the hardware is the first step in building the isolated system. The following steps outline how to set up the hardware to create three isolated subsystems and use the XPMU, XPPU, and TrustZone hardware to isolate each subsystem. The first step is to create the base hardware platform to build upon.

After starting the Vivado tools, click **Create Project** in the Quick Start page to open the New Project wizard. Use the information below to make selections in each of the wizard screens:

- Create a New Vivado Project
  
  No options. Select **Next**.

- Project Name
  
  Project name: `ps_isolation_lab`

  Project location: `c:/temp/xapp1320_2019.1/` (referred to later as `<your lab location>`)  

  Create project subdirectory: **checked**
• Project Type
  Check **Example Project**.

• Select Project Template
  Select **Base Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC**.

• Default board or part
  Select **Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board**.

• New Project Summary
  No options. Select **Finish**.

Afterwards your screen will look like **Figure 14**.

---

**Figure 14: Initial IP Integrator Diagram**

Now that a base hardware platform has been generated it is necessary to refine that definition for isolation.

1. Double-click the **Zynq UltraScale+ IP** (zynq_ultra_ps_e_0 instance).
2. Check **Switch To Advanced Mode** in the Page Navigator of the new pop-up window.
3. Select **Isolation Configuration** in the Page Navigator.
4. Check **Enable Isolation** at the top of the Isolation Configuration page.

The Secure Subsystem is a baseline subsystem for secure booting. The tools create this system as a baseline for you to start with. For ease of documentation, this reference design builds its own system. However, you can start with the Secure Subsystem to save time. Note that in 2019.1
and 2019.2, there was not an option to change that name. Future software releases may allow a name change.

5. Delete the Secure Subsystem.

6. Create two additional isolation subsystems (RPU and APU):
   a. Click on the + button to Add New Subsystem named RPU.
   b. Click on the + button to Add New Subsystem named APU.

When complete, your window should look like Figure 15.

![Re-cusomize IP Window: Base Isolation Subsystems](X22377-030119)

**Figure 15:** Re-cusomize IP Window: Base Isolation Subsystems

Before customizing the isolation systems, it is important to understand the three check boxes shown in Figure 15 as they have significant ramifications for isolated systems:

**Enable Isolation**

This is the key enabling function for isolation. You must check this for enabling an isolation setup in the reference design.

**Enable Secure Debug**

Enabling Secure Debug adds specific components to each isolated subsystem. Specifically, it adds DAP and CoreSight components as masters. Deselecting this option would prohibit JTAG access to any secure subsystem. This reference design keeps this option checked by default as it is expected to be used as a training guide for using isolation and debug. For fielded systems, however, care must be taken on the use of debug logic and debug access points. It is recommended that such components be under the control of the most secure (trusted) subsystem in your design.

**Lock Unused Memory**

Enabling this option restricts the use of all memory locations (memory and peripherals) not explicitly defined by the isolation setup. In a secure system this would typically be checked.
However, be mindful that there are operations in a system that are not always obvious to you and could be impacted by this parameter. For example, when loading authenticated and/or encrypted images after boot (a partial bitfile), the system must access the CSU, eFuse, and potentially BBRAM register space. If these are not explicitly added to the secure subsystem performing this action, then it is blocked by the setting of the Lock Unused Memory option. Use of this option for this reference design is not tested and is therefore assumed to be unchecked.

It is now necessary to add masters to each isolation subsystem.

1. Right-click APU, select Add Master, and search/select APU.
2. Right-click RPU, select Add Master and search/select RPU0.
   - Accept the default secure setting.

Now that each subsystem has a master, it is necessary to assign the slave components to the APU subsystem.

1. Add slave peripherals to the APU subsystem:
   a. Right-click APU to Add Slaves and search/select GPIO keeping NonSecure TZ setting.
      
      Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.
   b. Right-click APU to Add Slaves and search/select SWDT0 keeping NonSecure TZ setting.
   c. Right-click APU to Add Slaves and search/select TTC0 keeping NonSecure TZ setting.
   d. Right-click APU to Add Slaves and search/select UART0 keeping NonSecure TZ setting.

2. Add slave memory to the APU subsystem:
   a. Right-click APU to Add Slave and search/select OCM:
      - Start address: 0xFFFF0000
      - Size: 64 KB
      - TZ settings: NonSecure
      
      Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.
   b. Right-click APU to Add Slave and search/select DDR_LOW:
      - Start address: 0x0
      - Size: 32 MB
      - TZ settings: NonSecure
   c. Right-click APU to Add Slave and search/select DDR_LOW:
      - Start address: 0x60000000
      - Size: 1 MB
      - TZ settings: NonSecure
      
      Note: This is shared with the RPU subsystem.
With the APU subsystem fully populated it is now necessary to assign the slave components to the RPU subsystem.

**Note:** When building this subsystem some resources might appear in red when initially added. This is due to a temporary security conflict which gets resolved when the subsystem is fully defined. There should be no conflicts (no red) when completed.

1. **Add slave peripherals to the RPU subsystem:**
   a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **GPIO** keeping **NonSecure** TZ setting.  
      **Note:** This is shared with the APU subsystem.
   b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **I2C1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **SWDT1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **TTC1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   e. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **UART1** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.

2. **Add slave registers to the RPU subsystem** (Necessary because FSBL executes on RPU):
   a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **CRF_APB** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **CRL_APB** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **EFUSE** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **IOU_SLCR** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.
   e. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slaves** and search/select **RPU** selecting **Secure** TZ setting.

3. **Add slave memory to the RPU subsystem:**
   a. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **OCM**:
      - Start address: **0xFFF00000**
      - Size: **192 KB**
      - TZ settings: **Secure**
   b. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **OCM**:
      - Start address: **0xFFFF0000**
      - Size: **64 KB**
      - TZ settings: **NonSecure**  
      **Note:** This is shared with the APU subsystem.
   c. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
      - Start address: **0x40000000**
      - Size: **16 MB**
      - TZ settings: **Secure**
   d. Right-click **RPU** to **Add Slave** and search/select **DDR_LOW**:
      - Start address: **0x60000000**
At this stage the APU and RPU subsystems have been fully populated. However, the PMU subsystem needs a few modifications in order for the error messaging to reach the outside world.

1. Add slave peripherals to the PMU Firmware subsystem:
   a. Right-click PMU Firmware to Add Slaves and search/select UART0 keeping NonSecure TZ setting.
      
      *Note:* This is shared with the APU subsystem.
   b. Right-click PMU Firmware to Add Slaves and search/select UART1 keeping Secure TZ setting.

      *Note:* This is shared with the RPU subsystem.

2. At this stage the Isolation Configuration window should look like Figure 16.
3. Select **OK**.

The Vivado tools automatically generated the address map for the AXI IP in the sample design. However, because we have now changed the platform due to isolation restrictions, it is necessary to re-map that IP.

1. In the Address Editor tab of the Block Design window, simultaneously select both **axi_bram_ctrl_0** and **axi_gpio_0** segments.
   a. Right-click and select **Unmap Segment**.

---

**Figure 16:** Re-customize IP Window: PMU Complete
2. In the Address Editor, select the Data segment.
   a. Right-click and select Auto Assign Address.

Note: The PL peripherals axi_bram_ctrl_0 and axi_gpi_0 do not support the protection mechanism and are accessible by all AXI masters.

Now that a platform design has been created, it is necessary to implement the design to generate all the necessary hardware files for SDK.

1. In the Flow Navigator window, click Generate Bitstream and select Yes.
   a. Click Save if requested.
2. Click OK in the Launch Runs popup window.
   a. This process takes several minutes depending on the capability of the machine it is running on.
3. Click Cancel in the Bitstream Generation Completed popup window. It is not necessary to open the implemented design.

It is now necessary to export the newly created hardware platform and launch SDK.

1. Select File > Export > Export Hardware to export the hardware platform.
2. Select Include bitstream and click OK on the Export Hardware popup window.
   a. Keep the default Local to Project setting.
3. Select File > Launch SDK.
   a. Keep the default settings of Local to Project for both the Exported location and Workspace.
   b. Select OK.

Creating Demonstration Software

This section describes how to use SDK to create software that runs on the isolated system created in the previous section. To test the features previously discussed, five software projects will be created. These projects and their function are listed in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pmu_firmware</td>
<td>PMU firmware: event handler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r5_fsbl</td>
<td>FSBL running on R5_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rpu_iapi</td>
<td>Interprocessor interrupt code running on the R5_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rpu_fault_injection</td>
<td>Fault injection code running on the R5_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apu_iapi</td>
<td>Interprocessor interrupt code running on APU_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apu_fault_injection</td>
<td>Fault injection code running on the APU_0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because this lab runs multiple projects simultaneously, it is necessary to manually modify the linker scripts for each project. Failure to do so would result in memory collisions. For the purposes of this lab, however, the linker scripts will be imported along with the code (excluding FSBL and PMU projects where the defaults are acceptable).

**Creating the FSBL project**

The FSBL runs at boot time and loads the PS software projects and, if present, the PL bitstream. This section provides the steps necessary for creating this project.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.
   a. Project Name: `r5_fsbl`
   b. OS Platform: <default>
   c. Hardware Platform: <default>
   d. Processor: `psu_cortexr5_0`
   e. Language: <default>
   f. Compiler: <default>
   g. Hypervisor Guest: <default>
   h. Board Support Package: <default>
2. Click **Next**.
   a. Available Templates: **Zynq MP FSBL**
3. Click **Finish**.

**Creating the PMU project**

It is necessary to include the PMU firmware project for the following reasons:

- The PMU firmware project is required for any MPSoC processor system.
- Due to the issue with XMPU interrupts, it is desirable to have an independent secure master owning the protection units (XMPU and XPPU).

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.
   a. Project Name: `pmu_firmware`
   b. OS Platform: <default>
   c. Hardware Platform: <default>
   d. Processor: `psu_pmu_0`
   e. Language: <default>
   f. Compiler: <default>
   g. Hypervisor Guest: <default>
h. Board Support Package: <default>

2. Click **Next**.
   a. Available Templates: **ZynqMP PMU Firmware**

3. Click **Finish**.

Because the PMU owns the protections units and will be the primary system level error handler, it is necessary to add four build variables:

- **ENABLE_EM**: Enables the error manager of the PMU.
- **ENABLE_SCHEDULER**: Prerequisite for use of ENABLE_EM (see the PMU Firmware Build Flags table in *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Software Developer Guide* (UG1137) [Ref 4]).
- **XPU_INTR_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE**: Enhanced debug print information.
- **XPFW_DEBUG_DETAILED**: Enhanced debug print information.

*Note:* These variables are not necessary in a fielded system. They are only necessary for external messaging and adding more detail to that messaging. In a fielded system, they would not normally be set.

1. In the SDK Project Explorer window, right-click **pmu_firmware** and select **C/C++ Build Settings**.

2. Under **C/C++ Build**, select **Settings**.

3. Under MicroBlaze gcc compiler, select **Symbols**.

4. In the Defined Symbols area, click the symbol.
   a. Enter **ENABLE_EM** and click **OK**.

5. In the Defined Symbols area, click the symbol.
   a. Enter **ENABLE_SCHEDULER** and click **OK**.

6. In the Defined Symbols area, click the symbol.
   a. Enter **XPU_INTR_DEBUG_PRINT_ENABLE** and click **OK**.

7. In the Defined Symbols area, click the symbol.
   a. Enter **XPFW_DEBUG_DETAILED** and click **OK**.

8. In the SDK Project Explorer window, click **OK**.

The Properties for **pmu_firmware** window should look like **Figure 17**.
Creating the APU Inter-processor Interrupt Project

In an isolated system there is still a need for one subsystem to communicate with another subsystem. One method to do this safely and securely is to utilize the IPI system. This is demonstrated using two projects: the first runs in the APU subsystem, while the second runs in the RPU subsystem. This project targets the APU subsystem.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.
   a. Project Name: `apu_ipi`
   b. OS Platform: `<default>`
   c. Hardware Platform: `<default>`
   d. Processor: `psu_cortexa53_0`
   e. Language: `<default>`
   f. Compiler: `<default>`
   g. Hypervisor Guest: `<default>`

---

**Figure 17: PMU Build Symbols**
Creating the RPU Inter-processor Interrupt Project

In an isolated system there is still a need for one subsystem to communicate with another subsystem. One method to do this safely and securely is to utilize the IPI system. This is demonstrated using two projects: the first runs in the APU subsystem, while the second runs in the RPU subsystem. This project targets the RPU subsystem.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select File > New > Application Project.
   a. Project Name: rpu_ipi
   b. OS Platform: <default>
   c. Hardware Platform: <default>
   d. Processor: psu_cortexr5_0
   e. Language: <default>
   f. Compiler: <default>
   g. Hypervisor Guest: <default>
   h. Board Support Package: <default>
2. Click Next.
3. Click Finish.

Now that an empty project has been created, the delivered code can be imported.

1. In the Project Explorer windows, expand rpu_ipi and select src.
2. Right-click src and select Import.
3. Expand General in the Import window, select File System and click Next.
4. Use the Browse button to navigate to <your lab location>\software\c\ipiTest\rpu, click OK.
5. Click rpu in the left-hand pane, verify all files in the right-hand pane are selected, and click Finish. If prompted to overwrite files, select Yes.

Creating the APU Fault Injection Project

In applications that are safe, secure, or both, it is not sufficient to set up an isolation system and assume it will behave as expected. As such, it is necessary to physically test it with running software. While verification using a debug mode (such as JTAG boot) is useful to bring up the initial system, it is not sufficient to fully verify or validate the system. Thus, an application has been created as a base template to demonstrate the ability to prevent illegal reads and writes by the APU subsystem to various memories and peripherals. In a real system, this test would likely be much more exhaustive in its coverage.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select File > New > Application Project.
   a. Project Name: apu_fault_injection
   b. OS Platform: <default>
   c. Hardware Platform: <default>
   d. Processor: psu_cortexa53_0
   e. Language: <default>
   f. Compiler: <default>
   g. Hypervisor Guest: <default>
   h. Board Support Package: <default>
2. Click Next.
3. Click Finish.

Now that an empty project has been created, the delivered code can be imported.

1. In the Project Explorer windows, expand apu_fault_injection and select src.
2. Right-click src and select Import.
3. Expand General in the Import window, select File System and click Next.
4. Use the Browse button to navigate to <your lab location>\software\c\faultInjectionTest\apu, click OK.
5. Click `apu` in the left-hand pane, verify all files in the right-hand pane are selected, and click Finish. If prompted to overwrite files, select Yes.

**Creating the RPU Fault Injection Project**

In applications that are safe, secure, or both, it is not sufficient to set up an isolation system and assume it will behave as expected. As such, it is necessary to physically test it with running software. While verification using a debug mode (such as JTAG boot) is useful to bring up the initial system, it is not sufficient to fully verify or validate the system. Thus, an application has been created as a base template to demonstrate the ability to prevent illegal reads and writes by the RPU subsystem to various memories and peripherals. In a real system, this test would likely be much more exhaustive in its coverage.

Because the actual source code is delivered with this lab, it is necessary to create an empty project in which the code will be imported.

1. Select **File > New > Application Project**.
   a. Project Name: `rpu_fault_injection`
   b. OS Platform: `<default>`
   c. Hardware Platform: `<default>`
   d. Processor: `psu_cortexr5_0`
   e. Language: `<default>`
   f. Compiler: `<default>`
   g. Hypervisor Guest: `<default>`
   h. Board Support Package: `<default>`
2. Click Next.
   a. Available Templates: **Empty Application**.
3. Click Finish.

Now that an empty project has been created, the delivered code can be imported.

1. In the Project Explorer windows, expand `rpu_fault_injection` and select `src`.
2. Right-click `src` and select **Import**.
3. Expand **General** in the Import window, select **File System** and click **Next**.
4. Use the **Browse** button to navigate to `<your lab location>\software\c\faultInjectionTest\rpu`, click **OK**.
5. Click `rpu` in the left-hand pane, verify all files in the right-hand pane are selected, and click Finish. If prompted to overwrite files, select **Yes**.
Running the Applications

Now that the hardware platform and associated software applications have been built, it is time to generate the boot images and run the demonstration software.

*Note:* If projects have not been built, select **Project > Build All** and wait for the build to complete before proceeding to the next steps.

**Inter-processor Interrupts**

The applications that test IPI functions were built to demonstrate one method for two isolated subsystems to communicate with each other without the introduction of interference between the two systems. This build will have software running simultaneously on both the APU and RPU processors. Each application has two key functions:

- Send a message to the other subsystem
- Output the message received from the other subsystem

To build this system a BIF file will have to be created with five partitions:

- **r5_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.
- **pmu_firmware**: Error handler and messenger.
- **Base_Zynq_MPSOC_wrapper_hw_platform_0** (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.
- **apu_ipi**: Application running on A53_0 that sends and receives messages to the RPU subsystem.
- **rpu_ipi**: Application running on R5_0 that sends and receives messages to the APU subsystem.

*Note:* For the following steps, `<build path> = <your lab location>\xapp1320_2019.1\ps_isolation_lab.sdk`.

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image**.
   a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
   b. Check **Create new BIF file**
   c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>\output.bif`
   d. Output path: `<build path>\BOOT.bin`
   e. Continue to next steps **without** clicking Create Image.

2. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: `<build path>\r5_fsbl\Debug\r5_fsbl.elf`
   b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **R5 Single**
3. Click OK.
4. Click Add.
   a. File path: `<build path>\pmu_firmware\Debug\pmu_firmware.elf`
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
      - Optional: This could be `pmu (loaded by bootrom)`.  
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **PMU**
5. Click OK.
6. Click Add.
   a. File path: `<build path>\Base_Zynq_MPSoC_wrapper_hw_platform_0\Base_Zynq_MPSoC_wrapper.bit`
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PL**
7. Click OK.
8. Click Add.
   a. File path: `<build path>\apu_ipi\Debug\apu_ipi.elf`
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **A53 0**
   e. Exception Level: **EL0**
   f. Check **Enable Trust Zone**
9. Click OK.
10. Click Add.
    a. File path: `<build path>\rpu_ipi\Debug\rpu_ipi.elf`
    b. Partition Type: **datafile**
    c. Destination Device: **PS**
    d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**
11. The Create Boot Image window will look like **Figure 18**.
12. Click **Create Image**.
Now that you created a `BOOT.bin`, it can be copied to an SD card to be used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>\BOOT.bin` to an SD card.
2. Connect a USB-UART cable to the UART port of the board and identify the COM ports that were mapped to it.
3. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (APU) and UART1 (RPU).
   a. Baud rate: 115200
   b. Data bits: 8
   c. Parity: None
   d. Stop bits: 1
4. Set Boot Mode: SD (see Figure 19).
   a. `MODE[3:0] > 1110 > ON-ON-ON-OFF`
5. Insert SD card.
6. Power up the board.

*Figure 18: IPI System BIF Setup*
Figure 19: ZCU102 Board Setup
Figure 20 shows the IPI system output.

**APU Fault Injection**

For each demonstration, the fault injection is divided into two systems: APU and RPU. The first system built is the APU. Its function is to:

- Read and write non-secure regions of memory in its own domain.
- Read and write non-secure regions of memory outside its own domain.
- Read and write secure regions of memory (these are, by definition, outside of its domain).
- Read and write undefined regions of memory:
  - This is allowed in this lab but such regions can be excluded if desired when setting up the isolated subsystems using the check box **Lock Unused Memory** in the Isolation Configuration dialog.
- Read non-secure peripherals in its own domain:
  - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.
- Read secure peripherals (these are, by definition, outside of its own domain):
  - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.

To build this system a BIF file will have to be created with four partitions:
• **r5_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.

• **pmu_firmware**: Error handler and messenger.

• **Base_Zynq_MPSoc_wrapper_hw_platform_0** (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.

• **apu_fault_injection**: Application running on A53_0 that reads and writes to various memories and peripherals of the system.

To prevent a collision of messages between the FSBL, PMU, and application, it is necessary to modify the UART that the PMU will use. Recall that it was given both UART0 and UART1. Because the APU must output on UART0, the PMU UART must be changed to UART1.

1. In the Project Explorer tab, right-click **pmu_firmware_bsp** and select **Board Support Package Settings**.

2. Select **standalone**.

3. Change the values for stdin and stdout to psu_uart_1 by clicking in that field and selecting **psu_uart_1** from the pull-down menu (see **Figure 21**).

4. Select **OK**.

![Figure 21: Board Support Package Settings](image)

Now the system can be built.

**Note**: For the following steps, `<build path> = <your lab location>\ps_isolation_lab\ps_isolation_lab.sdk`

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image**.
   - a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
   - b. Check **Create new BIF file**
   - c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>\output.bif`
   - d. Output path: `<build path>\BOOT.bin`
   - e. Continue to next steps **without** clicking Create Image.

2. Click **Add**.
a. File path: <build path>5_fsbl\Debug\r5_fsbl.elf
b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
c. Destination Device: **PS**
d. Destination CPU: **R5 Single**

3. Click **OK**.

4. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: <build path>\pmu_firmware\Debug\pmu_firmware.elf
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
      - Optional: This could be *pmu (loaded by bootrom)*.
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **PMU**

5. Click **OK**.

6. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: <build path>\Base_Zynq_MPSoC_wrapper_hw_platform_0\Base_Zynq_MPSoC_wrapper.bit
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PL**

7. Click **OK**.

8. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: <build path>\apu_fault_injection\Debug\apu_fault_injection.elf
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **A53 0**
   e. Exception Level: **EL0**
   f. Check **Enable Trust Zone**

9. Click **OK**.

10. The Create Boot Image window looks like Figure 22.

11. Click **Create Image**. If asked to overwrite the previously created BIF/BIN file, select **OK**.
Now that you created a **BOOT.bin**, it can be copied to an SD card to be used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>`\BOOT.bin to an SD card.
2. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (APU) and UART1 (PMU).
   a. Baud rate: 115200
   b. Data bits: 8
   c. Parity: None
   d. Stop bits: 1
3. Set Boot Mode: SD (see Figure 19).
   a. `MODE[3:0] > 1110 > ON-ON-ON-OFF`
4. Insert SD card.
5. Power up the board.
Figure 23 shows the APU fault injection system output.

Note: In Figure 23, the PMU error messages correspond to each “Failed” attempt of the APU system to access a restricted address.

**RPU Fault Injection**

For each demonstration, the fault injection is divided into two systems: APU and RPU. The first system built was the APU. This section describes how to build the RPU system, whose function is to:

- Read and write non-secure regions of memory in its own domain.
- Read and write non-secure regions of memory outside its own domain.
- Read and write secure regions of memory.
- Read and write undefined regions of memory:
  - This is allowed in this lab but such regions can be excluded if desired when setting up the isolated subsystems.
- Read non-secure peripherals in its own domain:
- Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.
- Read secure peripherals (these are, by definition, outside of its own domain):
  - Writes have been intentionally skipped to prevent undesired consequences of blindly writing to a peripheral.

To build this system a BIF file will have to be created with four partitions:

- **r5_fsbl**: Sets up device isolation and loads all other partitions.
- **pmu_firmware**: Error handler and messenger.
- **Base_Zynq_MPSoC_wrapper_hw_platform_0** (PL Bitstream): No real function in this system.
- **rpu_fault_injection**: Application running on R5_0 that reads and writes to various memories and peripherals of the system.

To prevent a collision of messages between the FSBL, PMU, and application, it is necessary to modify the UART that the PMU will use. Recall that it was given both UART0 and UART1. Because the RPU must output on UART1, the PMU UART must be changed to UART0.

1. In the Project Explorer tab, right-click **pmu_firmware_bsp** and select **board support package settings**.
2. Select **standalone**.
3. Change the values for stdin and stdout to **psu_uart_0** by clicking in that field and selecting **psu_uart_0** from the pull-down menu.
4. Select **OK**.

Now the system can be built.

**Note:** For the following steps, `<build path> = <your lab location>/ps_isolation_lab/ps_isolation_lab.sdk`

1. Select **Xilinx > Create Boot Image**.
   a. Architecture: **Zynq MP**
   b. Check **Create new BIF file**
   c. Output BIF file path: `<build path>/output.bif`
   d. Output path: `<build path>/BOOT.bin`
   e. Continue to next steps **without** clicking Create Image.
2. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: `<build path>/r5_fsbl/Debug/r5_fsbl.elf`
   b. Partition Type: **bootloader**
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **R5 Single**
3. Click **OK**.

4. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: `<build path>`\pmu_firmware\Debug\pmu_firmware.elf
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
      - Optional: This could be *pmu (loaded by bootrom)*.
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **PMU**

5. Click **OK**.

6. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: `<build path>`\Base_Zynq_MPSoc_wrapper_hw_platform_0\Base_Zynq_MPSoc_wrapper.bit
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PL**

7. Click **OK**.

8. Click **Add**.
   a. File path: `<build path>`\rpu_fault_injection\Debug\rpu_fault_injection.elf
   b. Partition Type: **datafile**
   c. Destination Device: **PS**
   d. Destination CPU: **R5 0**

9. Click **OK**.

10. The Create Boot Image window looks like **Figure 24**.

11. Click **Create Image**. If asked to overwrite the previously created BIF/BIN file, select **OK**.
Now that a **BOOT.bin** has been created, it can be copied to an SD card and used to boot the development board.

1. Copy `<build path>`\BOOT.bin to an SD card.
2. Set up two serial communication terminals to observe output on UART0 (PMU) and UART1 (RPU).
   a. Baud rate: 115200
   b. Data bits: 8
   c. Parity: None
   d. Stop bits: 1
3. Set Boot Mode: SD (see Figure 19)
   a. MODE[3:0] > 1110 > ON-ON-ON-OFF
4. Insert SD card.
5. Power up the board.
Figure 25 shows the RPU fault injection system output.

Note: In Figure 25, the PMU error messages correspond to each “Failed” attempt of the RPU system to access a restricted address. The “Failed” message is part of the application error handler. The PMU messages are part of the built-in PMU system error handler.

Secure Boot

Up to this point, the reference design is focused only on isolation. However, many applications using isolation may require the device to boot securely. In such applications, it is necessary to verify the authenticity of the boot image prior to its use. Encrypting the boot image is required if you intend to maintain the confidentiality of your IP.

Because, secure boot is an application note on its own, it is not specifically addressed here. Rather, all necessary modifications are included in the reference design zip file. The BIFs, keys, and scripts to generate the same boot images previously built without secure boot are included and demonstrated how to:

- Add Authentication using RSA 4096 and SHA3 for the signature.
- Encrypt using AES-256 with galois counter mode (GCM).
- Use operational key (for good key management practices).
• Use physically unclonable function (PUF) for storing the user's encryption key in black (encrypted) form.

The following is a sample BIF:

```plaintext
//arch = synqmp; split = false; format = BIN
boot_image:
{
  // Authentication
  [pskfile] ...
  [sskfile] ...
  // Encryption
  [keysrc_encryption]efuse_blk_key
  [bh_key_iv] ...
  // FSBL
  [fsbl_config]shutter=0x00000000E, opt_key
  [bootloader, authentication = rsa, ppk_select = 0, spk_select=user-efuse, spk_id = 0x00, encryption = aes, aeskeyfile = ...
  [fsbl_config]shutter=0x000000005E, opt_key

  // PMU Firmware
  [authentication = rsa, ppk_select = 0, spk_select=user-efuse, spk_id = 0x001, encryption = aes, aeskeyfile = ...
  [pmu_config]shutter=0x000000005E, opt_key

  // PL Bitfile
  [authentication = rsa, ppk_select = 0, spk_select=user-efuse, spk_id = 0x002, encryption = aes, aeskeyfile = ...

  // R5-0 Application
  [authentication = rsa, ppk_select = 0, spk_select=user-efuse, spk_id = 0x003, encryption = aes, aeskeyfile = ...

  // A53-0 Application
  [authentication = rsa, ppk_select = 0, spk_select=user-efuse, spk_id = 0x004, encryption = aes, aeskeyfile = ...
}
```

The addition of secure boot does not require modification of the reference design. It only modifies the BIF used to generate the final BOOT.BIN file. It does, however, requires you to prepare the following:

• A set of keys for RSA authentication and AES encryption (device and operational keys).
• A device that has the PUF provisioned.
• A device that has RSA key(s) provisioned.
• A device that has the AES key provisioned (BBRAM or EFUSE).

The included README.TXT file describes the directories containing all files both for the base reference design as well as for the modifications for secure boot.

**Design Files**

Download the reference design files for this application note from the Xilinx website.

**Table 3** shows the reference design matrix.
Conclusion

With the large number of processors on the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC, designers need to ensure that code running on any processor or master is unable to interfere with or corrupt memory regions or peripherals that are not part of the master’s subsystem. This application note describes how to use the hardware and software mechanisms provided by the XMPU, XPPU, and TZ for the isolation of subsystems. This functionality complements other isolation methods such as least privilege, and hypervisors and a trusted execution environment (TEE).

References

1. Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Register Reference (UG1087)

Table 3: Reference Design Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Developer name</td>
<td>Steven McNeil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target devices</td>
<td>Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source code provided</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source code format</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design uses code and IP from existing Xilinx application note and reference designs or third party</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Static code analysis/MISRA C</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Simulation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Functional simulation performed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timing simulation performed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test bench used for functional and timing simulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test bench format</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simulator software/version used</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPICE/IBIS simulations</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
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<td>Implementation software tools/versions used</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hardware platform used for verification</td>
<td>ZCU102 evaluation board</td>
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</table>

4. Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC Software Developer Guide (UG1137)

5. Isolate Security-Critical Applications on Zynq UltraScale+ Devices (WP516)

6. Arm TrustZone

Revision History

The following table shows the revision history for this document.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>10/26/2020</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Added a new section: Known Limitations to Isolation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/27/2020</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Fixed broken arrows in Figure 13.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 04/30/2020 | 3.0     | • Updated for new version of the software and to address issues from customer feedback.  
           |          | • Added Secure Boot and Software Patch section.                           |
| 06/21/2019 | 2.0     | Updated for new version of the software and to address issues from customer feedback. |
| 07/26/2017 | 1.0     | Initial Xilinx release.                                                  |

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